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ABSTRACT
In the aim to prevent and manage major accidents on an industrial site, many methoäologies
and directives have been developed. But, in France no formalised methodology has been
proposed to competent authorities to determine a risk level o/ an industrial site. A first work
of methodologies' synthesis permitted to propose some basis of a new methodology. This one
will be based on the industrial site, the environment and the safety management. To reach this
aim, four Indexes are developed; the ßrst one concerning the hazard source (the
establishment), the second one the ßux (the vector of propagation of accident considering the
specißc environment), the third one the vulnerability of targets (human, environmental or
equipment), and ßnally the fourth one concerning the safety management (prevention and
protection actions). This new approach will provide a cartography of risk level for an
industrial site and its vicinity to bring a decision help for risk managers and competent
authorities.
1 INTRODUCTION
The SEVESO II directive [l] aims at preventing major accident that can härm people and the
environment around industrial establishment. In France, the Competent Authorities in Charge
of the application of the SEVESO II directive have no formalised methodology to assess the
risk related to major accident. A consequence of the lack of a formalised methodology is that
safety measures to prevent major accident are not always taken into aecount in a consistent
manner for the determination of the safety zones.
And generally speaking, in France, the safety zones are determined on the basis of potential
hazard, caiculated without taking into aecount neither all safety devices nor the efficiency of
the safety management [2]. In order to better understand the problem, we can take an
example : two similar establishments, with the same products, the same process, and with
equivalent quantities. The first establishment has a high level of safety, while the second
implements only the strict minimum to face up major accidents. At the moment, considering
only the potential of hazard, the safety zones associated to the two establishments could be at
the best the same. Indeed, because of the lack of formalized method, it is impossible to
compare in an unambiguous way the level of risk between two establishments.
The objectives of this study are to propose a risk assessment methodology allowing a first
diagnosis by focusing on major accidents and by taking into account all the actions aiming at
improving safety. This method brings out the efforts carried out by the operators to maintain
the establishment at a high level of safety.
This paper presents the first development of the methodology.
2 STATE OF THE ART
Thanks to a bibliographical review of risk analysis methodologies, we identified and studied
62 of them. The analysis of these methodologies leads us to highlight some essential features
of an operational method :
• Ranking criteria : the method should allow to rank the hazard and the other
Parameters that contribute to define a risk level, the sensitivity of the environment,
the efficiency of the safety management.
• A global approach : the method should allow a global analysis and should be
applicable for various industry types.
• Simplicity of use : the basis of the method should be clear and simple for two
reasons :
• To allow the dialogue between risk experts and the operators ;
• To allow that the operator continue to use the method without the expert help.
Among these sixty-two methodologies, some positive points can be extracted in order to
assess the risk level. The main points are :
- the industrial site (äs in a classical approach)
- the distribution way of accident
- the exposure level of the environment
- the safety management
None of the methodologies has really taken into consideration all the four points above.
Generally, whether methods are so general to provide an effective help decision or so specific
to only a part of the studied site.
3 METHODOLOGY
This section describes the methodology which is being developed. It is based on the
determination of 4 Indexes to characterise the risk level of an industrial Installation in its
environment.
3.1 System schematisation
If we bring these considerations in the context of the SEVESO II directive, the following
points can be added :
• Bringing out the safety measures organized in the safety management System
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against the major accidents [3],
• The need of harmonization,
• The integration of domino effects [4].
Finally, we propose to build up a new methodology based on the following features :
• The use of risk index (ranking method) like Avrim2 method [5] or Risk Level
Indicators method [6]
• The integration of the vumerability of the Environment (human, environmental
natural and material) [7] based on multi-criteria decision analysis with SAATY's
method [8],
• The use of an analysis of the safety management system[5].
The figure l hereunder explains the functioning of the method.














From the zone of study, one can extract four dominating elements :
• hazard source (the establishment)
• hazard flow (the vector of propagation)
• target, located in the vicinity of the establishment
• safety management, implemented by the operators.
Each of these elements allows to defme four Indexes, that after integration, constitute a
fünction of risk level. Actually, the used data are mainly located in safety reports and their
processing gives a risk level quantification. Finally this permits inspectors to assess the safety
management level for the industrial site.
The method mcludes two main phases.
• The first phase consists in estimating :
. The severity index S, considering the major accident hazards generated by the
source.
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. The flow index F, characterising the vector of propagarion with the notion of
exposition level.
. The vulnerability index V, characterising the environment including various
targets types (human, natural environment, material) by means of methods of
multt-criteria decision.
• The second phase characterizes the efficiency of safety management.
. The safety management index M takes into account the various types of
barriers (technical and human Operation) on the hazard source and the hazard
flow, äs well äs the intervention capacity of the intemal / extemal emergency
Services.
. The objective is to highlight actions led by operators to decrease the risks on
their establishments.
3.2 Index definition
3.2.1 Hazard source : Severity index S
The industrial establishment is characterised by the severity index S. The potential hazard
should allow to take into account and to quantify the level of risk of each critical area of the
industrial establishment studied.
The study of the industrial site is based on a fimctional scheme of the site and on safety
reports [9]. The first phase consist in identifying critical areas. A critical area is a part of the
site which is likely to generate a major accident. For each critical area, an event tree is
developed from initial events to the undesirable event leading to major accident [10].
To characterise major accident and the potential hazard, we must identify all parameters
describing the accidental phenomena. The physical effects [11] generated by the source are
overpressure, thermal flux, toxic gas dispersion, and liquid pollution.
Two type of major accident can be identified a sequence of events leading to one major
accident only, or a sequence of events leading to more than one major accident (domino
effect). Then two variables of potential hazards (PH) may be determined :
• direct PH,
• indirect PH or domino effect PH.
P H direct is function of Dangerous good used or stored and processes implies. It is very
important to consider stored products and goods' flux.
Specific criteria for dangerous goods are quantities of product likely to be involved in a major
accident and some chemical or physical characteristics in function of considered physical
effect :
• overpressure : chemical features (Lower and Upper Explosion Limit...),
• thermal flux : chemical features (heat of combustion, emissivity...),
• toxic gas dispersion : toxic threshold, effect generated on health,
• liquid pollution : toxic threshold, effect generated on health or environment.
Specific criteria for processes are considered like aggravation factors. In function of
conditions of process some penalties are attributed to the variable P H. A list of hazard
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process [10] is :
• A : System source of hazard of mechanical origin
• B : System source of hazard of chemical origin
• C : System source of hazard of electric origin
• D : System source of danger of fire development
The combining of process and dangerous goods parameters will provide the direct Potential
Hazard. The mdirect P H or the domino effect P H highiights major accidents implying
domino effects and a correction factor is attributed to the direct PH in function of the severity
of the final accident. The combining of PH direct and PH indirect will allow to caiculate the
Severity index of the source.
3.2.2 Propagation vector : Flo\v index F
The propagation vector will allow a description of the accident modes of transfer according to
the physical environment of propagation to characterize the level of target exposure [12].
In function of considered physical effect, the mode of transfer increases or decreases the
Potential hazard of the major accident.
The propagation vector index F is function of the distances between targets and source of
hazard, the environmental features, and the kinetics of accident propagation.
For example, to take into account :
• a toxic gas dispersion : a distribution of wind must be considered.
• a fire or explosion : it will be interesting to consider or not the presence of natural
barriers.
• liquid pollution : it will be interesting to consider the propagation speed äs a
function of target distance.
3.2.3 Vulnerability : Vulnerability index V
To assess the vulnerability of targets in an industrial establishment, we must considered the
accidental phenomena issued frorn the site and identified some criteria described the
sensitivity of targets [7].
The notion of impact must be taken into account to characterize the sensibility of targets into
environment. In fact, major accident leads to a physical effect that generated several types of
impacts on targets. Four kinds of physical effect can be considered for characterising the
sensitivity the overpressure, the thermal flux, the toxic gas dispersion, the liquid pollution.




It is important to consider that impacts, generated by physical effects, have a direct influence
on targets and that is not the physical effect itself. But the importance of impact depends on
the considered physical effect. Indeed, for an overpressure the economic impact may be more
important that for a toxic gas dispersion.
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The sanitary/environmental/integrity impact provides information carried on the target
sensitivity in front of physical effects conceming the fünctioning preservation of target. The
economic impact provides a characterisation of the whole cost induced by major accident.
The psychological impact characterises the human sensitivity from the effect on the different
types of targets.
In this first part, only the physical effect and impact were being described and not targets.
Targets correspond at human, environmental, or equipment targets which have a sensibility in
front of major accident. It must be interesting to separate targets in three classes (human,
environmental and equipment) in the aim to distinguish three values of vulnerability. Each
class of targets will be described in five categories, in this manner the whole targets can be
taking into account.
• Human class [13] is composed of the following categories :
- industrial establishment worker,
- rural and semi urban settlement (low and medium density of population),
- urban settlement (strong density of population),
- establishment public receiver ( like passenger Station, hopping centre, structure linked to
spare-time activities, general knowledge, health Services and public Services),
- large communication way (motorway, railway, road way with high density).
• Environmental class [13] is composed of the following categories :
- agricultural activities with a high market value (market gardening, vineyard)
- agricultural activities with medium market value (wheat, colza)
- Vegetation (forest, environment with herbaceous or bushing Vegetation, zone without
Vegetation like beach)
- specific natural site ( conservation area, nature reserve, national and country park)
- expanse of water (sea, swamp, lake, pond, river, water spring, aquaculture area).
• Equipment class [13] is composed of the following categories :
- industrial establishment,
- public structure (safety Services, communication network, gas and electricity network,
rail and road network, bridge, tunnel, airport),
- equipment implied in drinking water ( storage, treatment, distribution and hamessing
equipment),
- living quarter (house and building),
- public building (administration, school, university, church, monument, museum, leisure
equipment, market area).
A value of vulnerability will be caiculated for the whole categories of targets in fünction of a
physical effect and impact too.
The characterisation of the environment was being presented previously, but it is necessary to
rank the sensitivity of target according to the major accident. To reach this aim, a nultt-
criteria analysis method is used : the SAATY's method [8]. This methodology is based on
expert judgement which provides a rank of the sensitivity of each target sustaining an impact
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due to a physical effect.
To solve this problem, SAATY's method is used at 3 consecutive levels :
- l8' level : The determination of sensitivity of a target in front of each physical effect is
realised.
- 2 ° d level : For each physical effect, the importance of impact is ranked in fimction of
each type of targets.
- 3 r d level : For a physical effect given and a type of target given tob, the sensitivity of
target categories is ranked in fünction of impacts.
The whole matrix caiculation will give a value of vulnerability for each category of target
sustaining an impact due to a given physical effect
For the application of the methodology, the studied area is cut into meshes. In each mesh, the
first phase is to make a census of whole targets and so the determination of the vulnerability
value of this mesh will be able.
The combination of severity and flow and vulnerability Index characterises the potential
hazard of the System.
In second part of the work that will be carried out, a Control/Management parameter will be
establish to evaluate the global risk level.
3.2.4 Control/Management : Safety Management Index M
The Control/Management parameter will allow to take into account the different types of
technological barriers [10] (prevention, protection and Intervention) and to assess the
influence of the Safety Management System.
The combination of Potential Hazard of the system and the safety management index allow to
caiculate the level risk index.
4 CONCLUSION
The methodology proposed in this paper deal with the assessment of the risk level of an
industrial establishment by taking into account safety devices and safety management.
Indeed, the first phase of the methodology, presented here, provides the characterisation of a
potential hazard. The potential hazard allows to assess dangerousness of the site (process and
dangerous goods) and to take into account, on the one hand, the propagation vector of major
accident toward the environment and, on the other hand, the environment vulnerability.
The second phase will integrate all safety devices to modulate the potential hazard. The
combination of the four parameters will provide a risk level to characterise the risk generated
by an installation in its environment. The proposed methodology provides a global approach
of the level risk determination. This application allows to assess the risk level and ways to
decrease it and to highlight actions of prevention. This methodology should help decision-
making to manage safety on industrial sites.
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